

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

4618

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET Attachment

July 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
on Monday, August 3, 1981 -- 2:00 - 3:00 p.m. (C)

The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Planning Group, modified as required, to include addressees listed above in the Cabinet Room at 2:00 p.m. on August 3, 1981. The agenda will include two items. Papers for only one agenda item are attached. No papers will be provided for the other item. (C)

ONLY ADDRESSEES LISTED ABOVE ARE TO ATTEND. (U)

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

James W. Allen
Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Topics are: Space Shuttle and East West trade pol

Attachment

SECRET Attachment**SECRET**

DCI/IC 81-1296

1 AUG 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]

25X1

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT:

Background for ^{3 AUGUST NSPG} ~~31 July~~ NSC Meeting--Shuttle Policy
and Study Item

1. Attached for your review are:

a. The proposed policy statement and terms of reference provided
17 July by NSC Staff (annotated).

b. Talking points on the policy statement. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. From our perspective, the NSC-drafted statement could be interpreted to restrict DCI and SECDEF latitude of action on matters such as ELV backup. Although ostensibly an interim statement since a major study of alternatives is to be commissioned, it has the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy and would likely be used by OMB/NSC to thwart any backup initiatives we might recommend. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. The study's terms of reference are indeed ambitious, but I can find no fault in a substantive sense except the rather narrow scope of the ELV issue; i.e., backup. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Attachments: a/s

[REDACTED]

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

SECRET

SECRET

Space Shuttle Commitment

D/ICS Briefing Memo of 1 August 1981

- A. NSC Staff Paper -- Space Shuttle Commitment
- B. Talking Points on Proposed Policy Statement

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

SECRET

SECRETNSC REVIEW
COMPLETEDSPACE SHUTTLE COMMITMENT

With the first flight of the Shuttle, it is appropriate to review the nature of the commitment to this program. An NSC meeting has been scheduled to outline two issues for Presidential consideration: (1) a statement of our commitment to the Shuttle; (2) a preview of key decisions connected to the Shuttle Program.

Background. President Nixon authorized the Shuttle. The last Administration directed that the Shuttle be developed to meet the needs of all civilian, foreign, commercial, and defense users, but that priority be given to national security missions, which made the reconnaissance mission needs the main factor in Shuttle program considerations. Further, the policy meant that all satellites will eventually be launched by the Shuttle, maintaining non-reusable launch systems only until the Shuttle was a proven concept.

NASA has the overall responsibility for the Shuttle and is building facilities at the Kennedy Space Flight Center in Florida and at the Johnson Space Center in Texas. The Air Force is building Shuttle facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Air Force and NASA efforts are closely coordinated.

Issue 1: The first four Shuttle flights are test flights for proving performance. The first flight was a total success. The second flight is scheduled for September. There is no reason to change radically the nature of the overall Shuttle program. Continuing the Shuttle as a national program has interagency and public support; both sectors are awaiting a statement of Presidential policy. This argues that the United States should affirm its commitment to the Shuttle as a national space transportation system.

Issue 2: An interagency meeting held recently agreed that changes in major segments of the integrated Shuttle program would be a Presidential-level decision.

The group also agreed that Jay Keyworth consider our goals in space and assess what unmanned launch capabilities will be required in the decade ahead. A study examining future launch needs for defense, commercial and scientific users would complement any commitment to the Shuttle.

The most pressing issue is the proper pace of complete reliance on the Shuttle by doing away with non-reusable launch vehicles. This matter will form the initial phase of Jay Keyworth's study and will subsequently require Presidential review.

At Tab A is a proposed National Security Decision Directive that contains a Shuttle policy statement which can be declassified for public consumption. After Presidential approval, a memo chartering the study by Jay Keyworth on the Shuttle related issues will be disseminated. Study terms of reference are attached. (S)

SECRET

Review July 31, 1987

SECRET